The Fall of the House of Westminster

May 7, 2012

I’m almost done reading “The Escondido Theology:  A Reformed Response to Two Kingdom Theology” written by John Frame.  The book has caused quite a stir in the Reformed community.  Frame reviews the writing of many popular Reformed scholars and levels uncharacteristically harsh criticisms against them.  They have responded with similar vitriol, although as I’ll soon suggest, their reaction befits their status as theological scumbags, where Frame’s response is better understood as righteous indignation.  And, naturally, all this infighting has trickled down to the common level, prompting the author of the popular Green Baggins blog to post this message:

To all my readers, since 2K theology and related subjects seems to bring out the most viciously childish side of the commenters (WAY worse than any Federal Vision posts!), I propose to cease my review of Frame’s book. To tell you all the truth, I am embarrassed by it all. What should have been a substantive in-house debate and discussion turned into a mere screaming match. I suspect that those with substantive points to make were driven off by the mudslinging going on. And no, I will not allow comments on this post, because that will only result in more finger-pointing. It will be a very long time indeed before I allow any more 2K discussion on this blog. ~ Click here to see the original post.

Many of the readers of my blog are not religious and couldn’t care less about the squabbling that takes place among Christian theologians.  And even among my Christian readers, most are not Reformed and, I’d even suggest, see no value at all in systematic theology.  Those in the world who do care about this debate (and Frame’s contribution to it) seem caught up in the doctrinal dispute and have lost track of the big-picture.

I have a more Romantic view of the situation.  While that leaves me open to charges of naivete, I think it affords me a level of clarity that others are missing.  Furthermore, to those non-Christians who, nevertheless (contrary to their fallen natures) esteem their race, I encourage you to pay attention to this debate.  The results of it are sure to affect not only the future of Christendom, but the West.

But here:  I’ll tell you my view and hopefully you’ll understand the significance of Dr. Frame’s book and why this debate is important for all Westerners.

The “Age of Enlightenment” (so called) was a bad time for Christians.  Men rose up to challenge the sacred ideals of Christendom.  They broke free from the chains of theology and went a whoring after Satan.  The Church wasn’t ready for this sort of thing.  Vicious ideologies emerged and demons fomented political rebellions.  Regicide became the norm in Europe and the old Christian order was overthrown by a new order of propositional nationalism.

The philosophers were the priests in this new world-order.  Kant, Hegel, Rousseau and others.  (I don’t think anyone knows the full extent of this movement or how far back the roots of it really go and how many thinkers are involved in it).  The church retreated into pietism and irrelevance, leaving the world to be governed by these monsters.

But, then something happened that changed the landscape of the battle.  A movement among Dutch Calvinists (Abraham Kuyper, Herman Bavinck and others) began appealing to Scriptures as if God had relevant things to say about the world today.  They sought to make Jesus Christ Lord over *every* aspect of life!

This movement caught on and spread to America where it strongly influenced the thinking of men like J. Gresham Machen and Cornelius Van Til.  Responding to theological liberalism at Princeton Seminary, Machen left and founded his own seminary — a shining beacon of conservatism in an age of liberal dominance — Westminster Theological Seminary.

I’ve yet to visit Westminster, but I imagine it’s on a hill-top with a perpetual sunbeam flowing over the campus while a choir of angels sing a majestic note.  Machen eventually convinced Van Til to come teach at the seminary, and they, with the other wonderful theologians, brought on the fullest expression of Kuyper’s attitudes.  Van Til, especially, was able to show that God was sovereign over every area of life.  There is no neutrality, not even in philosophy or politics.

Some of the most passionate disciples of these men realized that *every* area of academia needed to be “reconstructed” along consistently Biblical lines.  Every subject, from sociology and anthropology, to economics and philosophy — all had to be brought under the dominion of Christ.  These “reconstructionists” eventually realized the need to apply God’s word and authority to the civil government as well.  Even the state was to yield to God.

The greatest defender of this Christian Reconstruction (and the greatest of Van Til’s students) was arguably Dr. Greg Bahnsen, whose clear and powerful defense of theonomy was like a lightening rod through the heart of Westminster Theological seminary.

But this position was so controversial — and demanded so much dedication and sacrifice — that few theologians at Westminster had the guts to endorse it.  They all flatly rejected Bahnsen’s view — especially the man Dr. Meredith Kline, who even suggested that Bahnsen might not be a covenant child of God!

Bahnen’s consistent application of Van Tillian theology forced Westminster to either give up a consistent Van Tillian approach to life, or face the entire might of post-Enlightenment Satania.

The faculty, including John Frame, caved in the face of Satania and decided to hammer Bahnsen instead of stay consistent with their Van Tillian theology.  Seventeen (!) years after Bahnsen’s “Theonomy in Christian Ethics”, the entire faculty of Westminster published a response “Theonomy: A Reformed Critique”.

But as Bahnsen pointed out in his rebuttal to the book, most of their “critique” couldn’t be counted as a critique at all!  Furthermore, much of the positions in the book, agreed with theonomy!  And worse still, when the authors finally get around to arguing against theonomy, they use arguments that were already refuted by Bahnsen years before (in some cases).  Westminster, it seemed, was unable to defeat consistent Van Tillianism.

Well, Dr. Bahnsen passed away but his memory lives on.  Westminster knew it had been defeated by Bahnsen and the Reconstructionists, but didn’t want to admit it.

Dr. Frame didn’t want to accept theonomy, but neither did he want to depart from Van Til’s tradition.  Over the years, in (what seems to be) Westminster’s attempt to come up with a way to defeat the theonomy movement, they’ve drifted into an incoherent position that Frame calls “The Escondido Theology” since the particulars of it are characteristic of a group of scholars out in Escondido California.

These men staged a gradual “coup” over the Westminster faculty (Westminster Theological Seminary opened a sister school in Escondido) and — following their mentor, Meredith Kline — began imposing a view of theology on Westminster that is viciously contrary to the Kuyper / Machen / Van Til tradition.  Of course, they still feel the need to coat their language in Van Tillian terms, and give lip service to the old-guard Westminster folk, but in practice, they no longer have any regard for the old seminary on the hill-top.

Dr. Frame’s book is an attempt to refute the Escondido “Two-Kingdom” theology, without being a consistent (theonomic) Van Tillian.  And while I, as a theonomist, object to Frame’s understanding of the law of God, I sympathize with his anger at these guys who are pursuing an incoherent theological system at the expense of the old Van Tillian orthodoxy.

A few criticisms of Frame’s book:

As wonderful as it is to see a theologian of Frame’s caliber tackle these theological revolutionaries, I feel like he’s aimed his book more at them than towards a lay audience.  I wish he would have devoted more time to explaining the overall narrative of *what* the Two-Kingdom position is for our benefit.  Instead, he presents a list of bullet points, offers some general criticism, then dives into his book reviews of the Two-Kingdom scholars.

I found some of his background information in chapter 1 very helpful — he discusses a bit of the history of this theological coup — but he never puts it in a broader historical context.  I suspect that’s because he realizes (as they all do) that the entire Two-Kingdom controversy is nothing more than a reaction to Dr. Greg Bahnsen.

On the plus side:

I suspect that Frame has problems presenting a coherent “narrative” of the overall two-Kingdom enterprise, because it’s such a confused position to begin with.  However, he comes closest in chapter four, where he reviews David Van Drunen’s book, “A Biblical Case for Natural Law”.

Van Drunen distinguishes between two “Kingdoms” in the world.  A spiritual kingdom and a civil kingdom.

Scripture is to govern the spiritual kingdom.

Natural law is to govern the civil kingdom. (see page 131 of Frame).

Any pagan can look at the world and see there’s a law to things that must be respected.  They’re obligated to obey that law (which was put in place when God made covenant with Noah, apparently).   The believer, on the other hand, is obligated to obey Scripture and govern churchly affairs in light of special revelation.  The unbeliever is *not* obligated to obey Scripture, then, since that would be an attempt to rule the Civil Kingdom according to the law of the Spiritual Kingdom.

Frame has many criticisms of this position (his entire book is a long refutation of this idea in all of its forms), so all I will say here is that — apologetically-speaking — if we are going to base our objective standard of morality in the nature of God, then we cannot be inconsistent by claiming that God’s nature is one way for Christians and another way for non-Christians.

No:  God doesn’t change.  Both the unbeliever and the believer owe allegiance to the same God and are obligated to obey the same moral standard.

Why this is important for Kinists:

In the wake of the Kuyperian tradition at Westminster, a popular movement sprung up among American Evangelicals — a movement that fostered political action, reconstruction of all areas of academia, and a consistent throwing-off of humanistic indoctrination.  We were finally fighting back.

Van Til’s theory of knowledge allows us to provide strong theological refutations of the alienists and social Marxists who are Hell-bent on destroying Western culture.

If the Two-Kingdom faction wins this war (and it looks like they own the field — John Frame is a lone voice in the wilderness) then all hope for bringing our Reformed brethren to sane racial views will have faded with the fires of Christian Reconstruction.

We can’t yield that kind of ground to a bunch incoherent anti-nomians.


Dr. Bahnsen on Galatians 3:28

April 13, 2012

One of the most often misquoted verses of scripture by our alienist friends, is Galatians 3 verse 28:

There is neither jew nor Gentile, neither slave nor free, nor is there male and female, for you are all one in Christ Jesus.

Any of my readers brave enough to challenge the alienist will likely hear this verse cited as proof that God not only allows, but ordains and encourages wholesale mixing of the races.  I’ve heard this verse appealed to as a support for grotesque sexual sins (homosexuality) as well.

But as Dr. Bahnsen shows, no serious Bible scholar can use this verse to imply the righteousness of wholesale race-mixing.  Even one of the most theologically-rigorous alienists out there, J. Daniel Hays, in his book “From Every People and Nation” admits that the verse does not abrogate physical distinctions among the church (see page 186).

It seems only the naive alienist, who isn’t interested in fair exegesis, or perhaps the lay-egalitarian who isn’t very systematic in his position, allude to this verse as the first volley in their attack against the walls of traditional European Christendom.  Dr. Bahnsen is no Kinist by any means (though his work has proven invaluable in helping form a Kinist case against Modernism) and has no intention of refuting the alienist in the following commentary.  If anything, he’s more concerned with upholding his theonomic interpretation of the NT and only makes a few brief concluding remarks about the passage.  However, these remarks are important and demonstrate a refreshing attitude towards the text, even though Dr. Bahnsen makes unfortunate concessions to contemporary whims.

The following citation is transcribed from Dr. Bahnsen’s lecture on Galatians 3:23 through chapter 4.  The file can be purchased at Covenant Media Foundation and is named: GB1162-Gal3.23-4.7.  The transcript begins at 30:55 into the lecture:

————————————————————————–

Back in chapter 3, verse 28:

There can be neither jew nor Greek, neither bond nor free, neither male nor female, for you are all one in Christ and have become the seed with Him.  The seed of Abraham and the children of God.  He tells us, there cannot be distinctions of rank within the household of God.

And he refers to three particular ones, but I think there are only three chosen examples because they were so prominent in Paul’s culture and day.  There are no distinctions within the household of God that puts one or another person ahead of the other in terms of spiritual privilege.

You know?  Whether you’re fat or thin or rich or poor or whether you’re black or white.  We can think about any number.  But the three Paul talks about are jew Greek, bond free, male female.  These are obvious distinctions, especially in jewish culture.  Jews prided themselves in being better than the Greeks and better than the Gentiles.

In Romans 2, Paul goes on and on about how, you know, “you pride yourselves in the law and you think you’re a teacher of the ignorant,” and on and on and on.  But the jews clearly thought of themselves as superior.  Paul now crushes jewish pride.  He says in Christ, jew or greek: makes no difference.

In Christ being master or slave, being freeman or bond servant means nothing.  In fact, we know in the days of the New Testament that some bond servants were spiritually much further along; saved or more mature than their masters. See?  Spirituality is not tied to privilege in this world.

And then he comes to another one which has been the source of unending controversy, it seems like, in my generation.  There’s neither male nor female.  You see?  To be a man, to be a male, is no better than to be a female if you’re in the household of God.  There’s no better or worse spiritually because of sexual differentiation.  Peter tells us in 1 Peter, that husbands and wives are co-heirs in the grace of life.  That they are on a par, spiritually, with one another.

Now, what conclusions — what inferences, can be logically drawn from this?  Can we conclude that, since in Christ there is neither Greek nor jew, that all ethnic distinctions have been biologically and sociologically eliminated?  That would be silly, wouldn’t it?

Would we conclude that, because in Christ, in terms of spiritual privilege in the House of God, there’s neither bond nor free, that therefore, slaves are not really slaves, and masters are not really masters?  Do we believe that all sexual differentiation has been removed because spiritually those that have these differentiations are one in Christ?   It doesn’t follow at all, does it?

When someone says “well, since there’s neither male nor female, then men can no longer have dominion over women.  Men cannot exercise authority over women in the church and husbands cannot have the dominance in the home!”

That just does not follow from what Paul is saying at all.  That isn’t what Paul is talking about.  Well, what is Paul talking about?  Our position of privilege in the Household of God.  And on that, though we are quick, and I am quick, to defend conservative theology against the intrusions of women’s liberation, I should be, and all of us should be, quick to insist that women ought not to be considered second class citizens.  And I do think there is that tendency to be rebuked among us.


Why Non-Calvinists Can’t Talk

April 11, 2011

My claim is that communication requires a certain sort of world.

In other words: The world *MUST* be a certain sort of place in order for communication to happen.

What sort of world you may ask?

My claim is:

The only sort of world in which communication is possible, is the sort of world Calvinist preach about!

More specifically: In this world (that Calvinists preach about) there exists an all-sovereign God who is LORD over everything, there is nothing at all outside of His control (not even the thoughts of men.)

So, why is it that communication is only possible in that sort of world?

We must ask ourselves what the presuppositions of communication are. What sorts of things are required to make talking possible in the first place?  And once we figure out what a few of those things are, then we have to ask ourselves if a non-Calvinist world can provide for them.

One presupposition we could examine is the idea of predication. The world we live in MUST be the sort of world in which “predication” is possible, or else none of us would be able to talk. Since we do talk, then we must live in a world where “predication” is possible. Most of our conversations involve predication, consider this example: “The barn is red.” You have predicated “redness” to the barn. You apply the predicate of the sentence to the subject.

What sort of world is required to account for predication? We MUST live in a world in which abstract concepts (like redness) can be consistently and accurately applied to particular objects (like barns.)

The world promoted by the non-Calvinist is not the sort of place where abstract concepts (like redness) can be consistently brought into contact with particular objects (like barns) because the mind of man is autonomous and completely free of God in that sort of world.

In this non-Calvinist world, man would have to name each new experience a new name! Man has all sorts of experiences that he calls: “barns.” But, he couldn’t consistently apply the term “barn” to each of his experiences, he would have to come up with a new name for each one.  (How would you like it if someone called you “man” every time he saw you, instead of calling you by your own, particular name?)

It would be the same way with every new “barn” you saw. It wouldn’t be a new “barn” …it would be a completely different object from the last thing you saw that you called “barn” and so you’d have to call it something new, perhaps: Bob. So you would end up with Barn, Bob, Bill, Barny, etc. You simply cannot predicate “barnness” to that jumble of boards, nails and hay that you see.  You would have to do the same thing for every new experience of the color red that you run across in life.  You’d have to re-name each experience (instead of calling them all “red,” you’d have to re-name the color each time, because they’re each different experiences!)

Imagine trying to communicate in that sort of world?  Instead of “The barn is red.”  You’d have to say:  “The bob is widget.” (or some such.)

Only in a Calvinist world, where man’s mind is NOT independent from an all-sovereign God, can we call a particular experience of boards, nails and hay a “barn” …and call that barn “red.” This is possible, because the abstract concepts (like redness) and the particular objects (like the barn) are brought together in His mind to begin with, and we (as creatures) think His thoughts after Him, and are, therefore, able to talk.


Is God Logic?

February 2, 2011

Often Christian apologists debate with atheists about morality.  The Christian proves that the atheist has no objective moral ground within his non-Christian worldview.  (He may retreat to subjectivity but the Christian notes that it’s impossible to live without moral absolutes and proceeds to show how by citing examples from every day life.)

The atheist is on the ropes at this point and so they pull out a sly trick.  They try and hang the Christian on the Euthyphro dilemma!   In one of Plato’s early dialogues, he describes Socrates’ encounter with a supposed religious expert named Euthyphro.  Socrates questions Euthypro about the gods and the nature of “piety” and eventually the encounter boils down to the following dilemma:

Do the gods decree what is “good” because they’re simply re-stating a moral law that lies outside themselves…

or

Do the gods decree what is “good” arbitrarily, in which case “good” is not universal but merely dependent on the whim of a dictator of sorts? Is what is good for the (human) goose not also good for the (divine) gander?

Now the Christian is on the horns of a dilemma.  If he says that God tells us what is right and wrong because God is appealing to some standard of morality outside Himself, then God is not the final authority…the other standard is!  But, if the Christian admits that “right and wrong” are standards arbitrarily chosen by God, then we still have no universal morality, since it depends on the capricious whims of a big tyrant in the sky!

The Christians have an answer for this though.  They respond by noting that morality is grounded in the very nature of God.  In other words, “right and wrong” are what they are because they are part of God!  In revealing His moral law to mankind, God reveals aspects of Himself.  God is the very definition of “good”!  And so, the dilemma turns out to be a false one, although very useful for the Christian apologist when he critiques poly-theistic moral systems!

There is no morality outside of God for Him to appeal to…and He is also NOT arbitrarily laying down some fickle system that He could change tomorrow if He wanted…rather, His revelations concerning morality are revelations of His unchanging, eternal, and omnibenevolent (totally good) nature!

Most Christian apologists understand this argument.  It’s the most frequent debate between Christians and non-Christians.  So, keeping the above motif in mind, we can look at the arguments surrounding the origin of logic and see that something similar takes place.

The Christian says the atheist has no way to account for logic in his unbelieving system.  The atheist hems and haws but the Christian, nevertheless, does an internal critique of the system and demonstrates that it’s impossible.  The atheist may retreat to some sort of subjectivity or irrationalism in which case, the Christian shows how it is impossible to live without logic.

At this point, the atheist is again on the ropes and may try pulling a similar dilemma out of his sleeve.  (Atheist philosopher Michael Martin, for instance, formulated his TANG argument: “The Transcendental Argument for the Non Existence of God” in which he tries to argue this way.)

Is God logical because He is simply conforming to the laws of the universe in which He resides…

or

Is God illogical but arbitrarily chose to create a logical world?

As above, the Christian doesn’t want to accept either.  If God is logical because He is merely conforming to the laws of a universe in which He resides, then we can no longer think of God as omnipresent since we’d have to picture Him as some being floating around in a larger universe.  We’d have to give up our Augustinian metaphysical view and accept some form of Greek metaphysics where God is simply the biggest guy in the universe but is NOT bigger than the universe.  Then we’d have to ask…”well, where did the laws of logic come from?  Who created the universe in which God resides?”  Absurdities would abound!

On the other hand, Christians don’t want to say that God is illogical, that would imply that He is absurd!   Atheist Michael Martin says it this way:

“And if principles of logic are contingent on God, they are not logically necessary. Moreover, if principles of logic are contingent on God, God could change them. Thus, God could make the law of noncontradiction false; in other words, God could arrange matters so that a proposition and its negation were true at the same time. But this is absurd. How could God arrange matters so that New Zealand is south of China and that New Zealand is not south of it?”

And so the Christian does not find either horn of the dilemma an attractive prospect.  But, like before (when dealing with morality) the Christian has a way out.  He says, “Logic is grounded in God’s unchanging nature and thus, both horns of the dilemma are skirted!”

Easy enough, right?  Well…not so fast.

Most Christians realize the importance of grounding “logic” in the nature of God in order to avoid the sort of dilemma described above.  However, when it comes to exactly HOW to do this, problems arise.

Given an Augustinian view of God (which is the historically Reformed position) God and His creation are totally separate.  This is usually referred to as the “Creator / Creature” distinction.  God is spirit and is “totally other.”  There is no point in which creation and God coincide!   Heresies arise when men try to formulate theological systems where God and man have a point of overlap and on the opposite extreme, some systems claim that God and man have no point of overlap at all! (IE: Islam.)   But the orthodox view walks the line between these two positions, claiming that God is completely transcendent (meaning, totally “other” and unaccessible to man) but that He is also completely immanent (meaning, that He is everywhere and totally accessible!)

This may sound like a contradiction, (God being both transcendent AND immanent) but it is only so apparently.  It only seems that way.  The biggest area of contention on this point arises when Christians discuss the knowledge of God.  Consider the following example:

God knows my phone number.

and

I know my phone number.

When looked at closer, we have the subject of knowledge:  (X) and the object of knowledge (y)…we have the knowing event, and we also have the entire knowing transaction!

[ X knows Y ]

G (God) knows Y (my phone number).

and

S (Shotgun) knows Y (my phone number).

Is it true that [ G knows Y ] is true in the exact same way that [ S knows Y ] is true?  Does God’s knowledge and my knowledge overlap here?

Well, we both share the same object of knowledge:  (my telephone number).  But, beyond that, we cannot equate the knowing process at all!  God knows infinitely, intuitively and immediately.  He has known my phone number from all eternity, where as I had to discover it in time!

So, it is a grave error to equate the knowledge of God with the knowledge of man.   God and man know the same object (telephone number, strawberries…or any fact that man can know) but they do not know it in the same way.

In order to preserve the doctrine of the Creator / Creature distinction, Christian theologian Cornelius Van Til posits the idea of analogical reasoning!

What is an analogy?  Consider this example:

Typing a password into a computer is LIKE opening a door with a key.

So, you have two situations:  [typing a password into a computer] and [opening a door with a key].

These are NOT identical situations, and yet, if you know something about the one, you can legitimately be said to know something about the other.  There are a lot of grandmas out there who have never typed a password into any sort of computer and yet they know all about using keys to unlock doors!   If you tell the grandma that using a password to log into a computer is ANALOGOUS to using a key to unlock a door, she will have gained some level of information about computers.

In getting back to the argument about logic, many Christians wish to simply say “logic is an attribute of God” and leave it at that…but as we just discussed, this isn’t possible since the nature of God’s knowledge is NOT to be equated with the nature of man’s knowledge (the objects of knowledge are the same, but the knowing transaction is different).  So, in some sense, we have to distinguish between the logic of God and the logic of man.

Consider John Frame’s remarks in “The Doctrine of the Knowledge of God”:

“Nevertheless it should be clear to all that logic as a human science is no different from physics, chemistry, sociology, or psychology; it changes over the years.  What is accepted in one century may not be accepted in another, and vice versa.  These are fallible systems, human systems.  They may not be equated with the mind of God.  God’s logic is divine; human logic is not.” pg. 255 and 256.

To understand what Frame means, it’s helpful to consider Van Til’s idea of analogy, as well as time-honored Christian theology

God is immutable!

“Naturally, God does not and cannot change since there is nothing besides His own eternal being on which He depends. (Mal 3:6; James 1:25).” Cornelius Van Til, “Christian Apologetics” 2nd Edition, pg. 25.

God is eternally unchanging.  He simply IS who He is!

When we say that God cannot both exist and not exist at the same time, we are NOT saying that God conforms to some law of logic (like the law of non-contradiction that says both A and ~ A cannot exist together in the same time and place) but rather, we’re saying that God’s nature is such that it does not contradict itself.

This is a “divine logic” and it would certainly be an aspect of His nature.  It’s the “nature” of his “nature”!

But we cannot, indeed we MUST not confuse this with man’s logic: the law of non-contradiction, the law of Identity or any such logical systems.  Logical systems are always changing, being refined or given up.  If we equate “the law of non-contradiction” with God’s nature, then we’d never know God’s nature since many philosophers of logic cannot seem to agree over the nature of the law of non-contradiction itself!  And also, we’d have to admit that every time someone performs a correct logical calculation, they are participating in the God head!

No, as Van Til has shown us…man’s knowledge (including his use of and knowledge of logic) is ANALOGOUS to God’s knowledge (and logic) but NOT identical with it.  The two should never be confused (as Frame reminds us in the citation above.)

It must also be pointed out that there is a difference between saying that man only knows an analogy, and that man knows “analogously.”

Remember the grandma analogy:  [passwords unlock computers] is like [keys unlock doors.]  She learns some truth about passwords (at least, we can grant that she learns something about passwords if the analogy is presented correctly by her granddaughter and all Grandma’s sense faculties are operating properly and if the analogy happens to be true, etc.)

So she gains knowledge about passwords and computers (even though she has no experience with them).  This knowledge can be said to be “analogous!”  She has never experienced the computer and may never experience one (just like finite creatures can NEVER possibly experience an infinite God) and yet, she still has legitimate knowledge about the computers that she gained analogously.  She doesn’t simply know of the particular analogy (passwords are like keys) she reasons in terms of it.  There is a difference between simply knowing an analogy and knowing by analogy.  (It’s important to clarify this in light of possible objections.)

So, is God logic?  We have to conclude that, in one sense, God’s nature is the very definition of logic and possibility, but in another, very important sense, God cannot be equated with logical systems.  God created this world to reflect His glory, and as a part of that reflection, we notice that things cannot both exist and not exist at the same time.  We call this the law of non-contradiction, but it is not equated with God’s nature but is merely a created reflection of it.  It’s a description of creation, not of God.


Critique of Van Til / Bahnsen Refuted

January 10, 2011

Someone (who wishes not to be mentioned) presented an argument to me against Van Til and Bahnsen’s apologetic methodology.  I will state the argument and respond with 3 criticisms.  (The individual who formulated the argument claims to be in contact with John Frame and Scott Oliphint — leading presuppositionalists.)  I have corrected the spelling and formatted the text for my blog.  It remains otherwise unchanged from his presentation:

(1) If Van Til, or Bahnsen is right about apologetic methodology, then it is a tenet of proper apologetic method that no one can know that any proposition is true apart from presupposing the truth of (Reformed) Christian Theism.

(2) If it is a tenet of proper apologetic method that no one can know that any proposition is true apart from presupposing the truth of (Reformed) Christian Theism, then a subsumed tenet of proper apologetic method will be an analysis or logical definition of ‘presupposition’ [after all, if we are competent users of the words we employ in sentences, we will know what concepts they denote.]

(3) Presuppositionalists (in their writings) have (a) [historical point] proffered no analysis or logical definition of presupposition save P.F. Strawson’s semantic account in terms of entailment, and (b) have no contemporary analysis to avail themselves to, since all current analyses which are either compatible with presuppositionalism but demonstrably false, or straightforwardly incompatible with presuppositionalism as advocated by Van Til and Bahnsen.

(4) If (3) is true, then either the central tenet in the consequent of (1) is either (a) not understood, or (b) false.

(5) If (4a), then presuppositionalism can only be partially defined and so cannot be a proper apologetic method, since we simply don’t understand one of its central tenets.

(6) If (4b), then presuppositionalism as advocated by Van Til and Bahnsen, is not proper apologetic method after all.

(7) (4a) or (4b).

(8) Therefore, Either, presuppositionalism can only be partially defined and so cannot be a proper apologetic method, since we are unable to understand one of its tenets, or presuppostionalism is not proper apologetic method because one of its central tenets is false.

(DONE)

Shotgun’s first criticism:

This argument commits the informal, ad hominem fallacy.

It may be that presuppositionalists have not clearly defined a term that they employ, but does that necessarily mean that presuppositionalism is not a proper apologetic method?

Since discussions of proper apologetic methodology necessarily require a discussion of the man, then critiquing the man, in some sense would not be fallacious, however, in this sense, it seems to me, to be fallacious:

It is presupposed that a ‘proper’ apologetic must be one in which all the terms utilized in the argument are logically precise and analyzed.  But, the argument is framed in such a way that it is interested in doing an internal critique of Van Til and Bahnsen’s apologetic methodology.  If this is the case, then what is or is not a ‘proper’ methodology needs to be judged by Bahnsen and Van Til’s standard.  It could be that Bahnsen and Van Til are completely consistent in their methodology, even if they’ve not adequately analyzed the term “presupposition” and therefore, when the argument concludes that presuppositionalism is not a ‘proper’ apologetic methodology, it is importing a foreign idea of ‘proper apologetic’ into the argument.

In First Peter 3 verse 15, the Apostle implies that all Christians at all times are to be ready to give a reason for the hope that they have:

But in your hearts revere Christ as Lord. Always be prepared to give an answer to everyone who asks you to give the reason for the hope that you have. But do this with gentleness and respect,

This verse implies that it is the job of all Christians to practice apologetics with gentleness and respect.  Obviously, more must be required for a proper apologetic methodology, however it is in no way prima-facie obvious then, that a ‘proper’ Christian apologetic is one where all the terms employed have been rigorously analyzed by logicians nor is it clear that Bahnsen and Van Til would have thought otherwise.  This argument is simply pointing out that presuppositionalists are not living up to an alien, arbitrary standard, which does not necessarily imply that they are using an improper Christian apologetic in the least.

It’s little more than name-calling.

Shotgun’s second criticism:

This criticism echos the first only, where the first criticism highlighted an informal fallacy, my second criticism highlights a formal fallacy, namely; the conclusion does not follow from the premises.

As I already pointed out, an arbitrary standard of what is a ‘proper’ Christian apologetic is in view.

Does ‘improper apologetic methodlogy’ follow from ‘unclear terms’?

I drive a car almost every day and yet, I don’t fully realize how the car works.  However, I successfully get from one place to the other (if I can keep the state-troopers from robbing me blind).   Would anyone suggest that my travel (using the car) was not successful because I did not fully understand how the engine works?

In the same way, the presupposed (and arbitrary) standard of a ‘proper Christian apologetic’ implies that a proper Christian apologetic is one in which every term utilized is clearly understood.  But, this is not a coherent standard, because there are plenty of arguments that one could utilize, where all the terms are clearly understood, but are certainly NOT to be considered proper Christian apologetics!

For example:   The sky is blue, therefore God exists!  (I know what “sky” is, I know what “is blue” denotes, I understand “therefore” and while the term “God” and “exists” may have some ambiguity, only a few would argue that they’re impossible to understand.)

Some other standard must be added, presumably something having to do with the validity and strength of the argument.

There are plenty of arguments that are strong and valid but that utilize words that have not been thoroughly analyzed.

So, it seems that the argument in question presupposes an ad-hoc standard for ‘proper Christian apologetics’ that is not necessary.

In light of this, the conclusion of the argument does not follow from the premises in any clear way.  (The author of the argument would have to provide us with the reasoning behind his special standard of propriety in Christian apologetic arguments before the conclusion can be said to follow necessarily from the premises.)

Shotgun’s third criticism:

Premise 2 equivocates between the verb “presupposing” and the noun “presupposition.”

To be precise, premise 2 should argue for a logical analysis of the “act of presupposing” instead of the term “presupposition” or else, it should have been phrased differently to emphasize the question concerning “presuppositions.”

Likewise:  premise 3 has problems.  To prove premise 3 is true, it would have to be shown that Strawson’s semantic formulation of presuppositions is either demonstrably false or incompatible with Bahnsen and Van Til.   This is, presumably, what the person who presented the argument was eager to discuss, although it is beyond the scope of my criticism here.   It must be said, however, that this premise is in no sense clearly true.

Another problem with premise 3 is the idea that “all” and “current” literature concerning “presuppositions” is either demonstrably false or incompatible with Bahnsen and Van Til.  It must first be asked why the arbitrary bias towards “current” literature?   Is Immanuel Kant to be considered current?  Does Kant offer no beneficial insights to transcendental arguments and what is meant by “presupposition?”  How about Duns Scotus or Thomas Aquinas?  Why exclude them?   Something else that must be considered is that:  there is a very large number of philosophers and laymen out there writing today.  Even with the advent of the internet, it is highly unlikely that any one person will be able to pour through all the written material (even if we arbitrarily exclude any material not considered “current”) enough to say that ALL current material is either demonstrably false or incompatible with Bahnsen / Van Til.

Unless the argument presupposes some sort of metaphysical reason why this is the case, and can thus speak universally without relying on empirical investigation and study of ALL current material…this premise seems very problematic and impossible to prove.

Conclusion:

In light of these criticisms, I intend to continue arguing presuppositionally.


A Short Exposition of Philosophical Literature Dealing with “Presuppositions.”

January 6, 2011

Debates about proper methods of defending the Christian Faith have been raging for quite awhile and show no signs of slowing.  I’ve been involved myself.  For the past six years, I’ve been practicing what is commonly called “Presuppositional Apologetics” in the line of the infamous theologian, Cornelius Van Til.

This is a thoroughly Reformed method of defending the Christian Faith, though I didn’t realize it when I first began studying.  In fact, I was utilizing common formulations of Presuppositional arguments before I even knew what Calvinism was!

Due to the ambiguity in the term “Presuppositionalism” and misunderstandings concerning what a “presupposition” even is, many (like K. Scott Oliphint) have argued for giving up the term completely.   (Oliphint argues for using the name: Covenantal Apologetics, and I love the sound of it, but unfortunately, that term has not trickled down to colloquial usage.)

A few years ago I wrote a short blog that tried to clarify the term “presupposition” though since then, my understanding has increased (if only slightly.)  I realize that there are more analytical objections to the term and that some are attempting to argue that it’s impossible to coherently define at all!

Well, this is a bit contentious, I think.  Many philosophers, afterall, seem to share Van Til’s concerns about human experience and the hierarchy of beliefs that we all (presumably) maintain.  If there is a hierarchy of beliefs in a particular model, then one belief will precede or proceed another…the former being “presupposed” by the latter, or the “presupposition” of the latter.

Descartes, as a good example, is concerned with ordering his beliefs.  In the Discourse on Method (Part II, pg. 17 of the E. N. Meyer translation), he states four precepts that, if rigidly adhered to, would help him properly order his beliefs:

“The first was never to accept anything for true which I did not clearly know to be such; that is to say, carefully to avoid prescipitancy and prejudice, and to comprise nothing more in my judgment than what was presented to my mind so clearly and distinctly as to exclude all ground of doubt.

The second, to divide each of the difficulties under examination into as many parts as possible, and as might be necessary for its adequate solution.

The third, to conduct my thoughts in such order that, by commencing with objects the simplest and easiest to know, I might ascend by little and little, and as it were, step by step, to the knowledge of the more complex; assigning in the thought a certain order even to those objects which in their own nature do not stand in a relation of antecedence and sequence.

And the last, in every case to make enumerations so complete, and reviews so general, that I might be assured that nothing was omitted.”

Descartes is clearly concerned with properly ordering his beliefs, from the more ‘foundational’ or ‘simple’ (whatever that may mean) to the more ‘complex’.   He, presumably, realizes that this sort of self-conscious method (of ordering thoughts) is needed because so many people do not realize the beliefs that underlie, lay-behind, or that are “presupposed” by their more complex beliefs.

Bertrand Russell realizes this as well.  In “Problems of Philosophy” (chapter 2) he says this:

“Philosophy should show us the hierarchy of our instinctive beliefs, beginning with those we hold most strongly, and presenting each as much isolated and as free from irrelevant additions as possible.  It should take care to show that, in the form in which they are finally set forth, our instinctive beliefs do not clash, but form a harmonious system.  There can never be any reason for rejecting one instinctive belief except that it clashes with others; thus, if they are found to harmonise, the whole system becomes worthy of acceptance.”

Russel here, admits to a hierarchy of beliefs that we hold instinctively and realizes that if these beliefs conflict, the entire system (or, as a rough parallel:  what Descartes was calling a “complex belief”) must be rejected.  This, arguably, is comparable to Van Til’s Presuppositional methodology, which seeks to investigate this series of “instinctively-held beliefs” and see if they conflict with each other.  Although, Van Til would maintain that, in the Christian / Reformed metaphysical system, all non-Christian systems will have (at some point or other) conflicting beliefs.  Along with Russell, he would agree that, this inconsistency is cause for a rejection of the particular system under consideration.  Russell’s “instinctive beliefs” then, are comparable to the term “presuppositions.”

Alfred North Whitehead goes even further than this, in his “Process and Reality” (chapter 1, section 1).  He realizes at the outset that the system he is trying to construct must necessarily involve fundamental principles that, in isolation, are meaningless, but when ordered,  take on meaning.  In this hierarchy, Whitehead admits, the more foundational ideas are presupposed by the more complex:

“Speculative Philosophy is the endeavour to frame a coherent, logical, necessary system of general ideas in terms of which every element of our experience can be interpreted.  By this notion of ‘interpretation’ I mean that everything of which we are conscious, as enjoyed, perceived, willed, or thought, shall have the character of particular instance of the general scheme.  Thus the philosophical scheme should be coherent, logical, and in respect to its interpretation, applicable and adequate.  Here ‘applicable’ means that some items of experience are thus interpretable, and ‘adequate’ means that there are no items incapable of such interpretation.

‘Coherence,’ as here employed, means that the fundamental ideas, in terms of which the scheme is developed, presuppose each other so that in isolation they are meaningless.  This requirement does not mean that they are definable in terms of each other; it means that what is indefinable in one such notion cannot be abstracted from its relevance to the other notions.   It is the ideal of speculative philosophy that its fundamental notions shall not seem capable of abstraction from each other.  In other words, it is presupposed that no entity can be conceived in complete abstraction from the system of the universe, and that it is the business of speculative philosophy to exhibit this truth.  This character is coherence.”

To Whitehead, an idea becomes coherent when it is properly fitted into the system of general ideas which give it meaning.  There is, then, at least to Whitehead, a certain necessity to the idea of ordering one’s beliefs into a hierarchical system.

Karl Popper is less discreet than Whitehead, preferring to think of these foundational beliefs as vague, common-sense notions:

“My first thesis is thus that our starting-point is common sense, and that our great instrument for progress is criticism.

But this thesis raises at once a difficulty.  It has been said that if we wish to criticize a theory, say T1, whether or not it is of a commonsense character, then we need some other theory, T2, which furnishes us with the necessary basis or starting-point or background for criticizing T1.  Only in the very special case that we can show T1 to be inconsistent (a case called ‘immanent criticism’, where we use T1 in order to show that T1 is false) can we proceed differently; that is, by showing that absurd consequences follow from T1.” - (Objective Knowledge, chapter 2 pg. 34)

Popper goes on to explain why he thinks that this particular criticism of the method of criticism is invalid.  We can ‘objectively’ critique T1 without having a basis in some other system (T2) from which to stand to make the criticism, because, when T1 and T2 are presented side-by-side, we simply show which one has more advantages over the other.  (By way of a passing critique, it seems that Popper is unknowingly critiquing both T1 AND T2 from his ignorantly presupposed system of T3!)

So, whether our underlying assumptions about the world are investigated systematically, according to an arbitrary set of standards (as Descartes did above), whether they are rigorously worked into an overall metaphysical system (like Whitehead), or whether they’re simply assumed to be vague, common-sense notions (like Popper), it must be admitted that they are arranged in some order, from simple to complex…at least as far as these guys are concerned.

This all roughly correlates to what Van Til meant by a “presupposition.”  The critics of Presuppositional Apologetic methodology seldom take the time to do a fair comparison.  Compare the above citations to Dr. Bahnsen’s classic definition of a presupposition:

A “presupposition” is an elementary assumption in one’s reasoning or in the process by which opinions are formed. In this book, a “presupposition” is not just any assumption in an argument, but a personal commitment that is held at the most basic level of one’s network of beliefs. Presuppositions form a wide-ranging, foundational perspective (or starting point) in terms of which everything else is interpreted and evaluated. As such, presuppositions have the greatest authority in one’s thinking, being treated as one’s least negotiable beliefs and being granted the highest immunity to revision. (Bahnsen, Van Til’s Apologetic, 2 n.4)

While all these thinkers use the idea of a hierarchy of beliefs in different ways, (and mean slightly different things in each of their conceptions) there is an obvious similarity among them all.  Some beliefs precede others in one’s worldview, and those, more simple ideas, are presupposed by the more complex ideas.

There is ice in the freezer, presupposes the idea that there is such a thing as a freezer, that water turns into ice when frozen, that there was water in the freezer to begin with, that the freezer was working properly, that there is some idea of change, by which objects change characteristics…on and on and on we could go!  All of these things are presupposed by the complex belief: “There is ice in the freezer.”  They all precede “There is Ice in the freezer” in one’s hierarchy of beliefs.

That’s not so hard to understand, really.

The difficulties arise when we begin trying to critique another person’s various, underlying assumptions about this or that idea!


An Alienist Autopsy

December 14, 2010

And scenes like these, on memory’s tablet draw,
Bring back to Britain; there give local form
To each idea; and if Nature lend
Materials fit of torrent, rock, and shade
Produce new TIVOLIS.  But learn to rein,
O Youth!  whose skill essays the arduous task,
That skill within the limit she allows.

Great Nature scorns control: she will not bear
One beauty foreign to the spot or soil
She gives the to adorn: ’tis thine alone
To mend, not change her features.  Does her hand
Stretch forth a level lawn?  Ah, hope not thou
To lift the mountains there.  Do mountains frown
Around?  Ah, wish not there the level lawn.
Yet she permits thy art discreetly us’d,
To smooth the rugged and swell the plain.
But dare with caution; else expect, bold man!
The injur’d Genius of the place to rise
In self-defense, and, like some giant fiend
That frowns in Gothic story, swift destroy,
By night, the puny labors of thy day.

- The English Garden – William Mason

Man seeks to grab human experience and bend it, along with all reality, to his whim!  This has been the ever-present temptation since the dawn of time, and it is here that Satan makes his stand against our mutual creator.  Theologians have made much of the Fall of man and I don’t intend to add more to what has been said.  Instead, I wish to highlight this important aspect since from it, all of our contemporary woes can be traced.

Cornelius Van Til recognizes the true nature of Adam and Eve’s transgression:

As a creature of God man had to live in accordance with the law of God, that is, in accordance with the ordinances that God had placed in His creation….When man fell it was therefore his attempt to do without God in every respect.  Man sought his ideals of truth, goodness, and beauty somewhere beyond God, either directly within himself or in the universe about him.  God had interpreted the universe for him, or we may say man had interpreted the universe under the direction of God, but now he sought to interpret the universe without reference to God.

The result for man was that he made for himself a false ideal of knowledge.  Man made for himself the ideal of absolute comprehension in knowledge.  This he could never have done if he had continued to recognize that he was a creature.  It is totally inconsistent with the idea of a creatureliness that man should strive for comprehensive knowledge; if it could be attained, it would wipe God out of existence; man would then be God.” – Defense of the Faith pg. 36

Instead of submitting himself and interpreting reality under the direction of God, Adam decided to judge for himself what the nature of reality was to be.  He would choose for himself what was right and what was wrong.  This lust for god-hood has been passed along to all those of Adam’s flesh.

And so history finds a subtle confrontation between those who would interpret reality under God’s direction and those who would re-interpret reality along the lines of their own whim.  The outworking of this rebellion is many-headed, taking various forms in all different areas of life but none more self-consciously than in philosophy.  Although, try as he may to become God, man remains man and his quest for godhood resulted in the pessimism and frustration of modern philosophy:

“Modern philosophy had concluded that, since the world is beyond understanding, and because things-in-themselves, if they exist, are still unknowable, first, the only real world for autonomous man is himself, and second, the ‘problem’ of philosophy is no longer knowing and understanding the world, but remaking it in man’s own image.” - Rushdoony “Death of Meaning” pg. 29

This sort of pessimism gradually lead to more and more pragmatic philosophy.  We have the likes of Schelling teaching the moderns that individual human consciousness is the only possible object of knowledge.  The idea, or specifically, the proposition, becomes the key element of human experience.  It is this proposition that must be manipulated.

And, propositional knowledge was manipulated and has integrated itself into contemporary Christian theology, specifically concerning racial issues and ideas of race mixing.  Since man no longer seeks to interpret his experiences in light of God’s law (which, Van Til loosely meant the equivalent of:  “natural law” or the God-ordained order in nature / reality) then he must begin with some other standard.

James H. Cone, in his book “A Black Theology of Liberation” clearly establishes what is to be his standard of knowledge:

“Because black theology begins with the black condition as the fundamental datum of human experience, we cannot gloss over the significance and the concreteness of human oppression in the world in which blacks are condemned to live.  In its concern for concreteness, black theology resembles existentialism, with its conviction that “existence precedes essence” (to use Sartre’s phrase.)  This means that the concrete human being must be the point of departure of any phenomenological analysis of human existence.” – pg. 84

It is true that the black theology described by Cone resembles existentialism.  Existentialism is the greatest and purest expression of mankind’s original sin.

But, even among those less-radical thinkers, especially in the contemporary Christian church, there are those who seek to re-interpret the great system of Christian theology passed down to us from our ancestors.  They seek to transform it from a heart-felt expression of loyalty to a God who descended to Earth, became man and rescued us from our sins, into the worship of an abstract proposition which is accessible by all men equally.  In this way, contemporary theologians are ignorantly giving ground to the modernism and existentialism of the Satanic society in which they are a part.

This is clearly seen in J. Daniel Hays’ book “From Every People and Nation: A Biblical Theology of Race” although, unlike Cone, Hays knows better than to openly admit to existentialism.  And so, I’ll briefly demonstrate how his theological view concerning race is nothing more than a rejection of God-ordained order in favor of the fiat declaration of man.  Consider Hays’ view of the ultimate end of Christendom:

“The New Testament proclaims that in Christ believers form a new humanity.  The old barrier of hostility and division between ethnic groups has been demolished by the Cross, and now all peoples of all groups are to be one in Christ.  Our primary identity as humans is to be based on our union with Christ, and no longer based on traditional human sociological connections.  Christians of other races are not just equal to us; they are joined to us.  We are both part of the same body, united by the presence of the Holy Spirit that dwells within us both.  We are also fellow heirs, brothers and sisters of the same family.” – pg. 204

Notice that, to Hays, all “traditional human sociological connections” have been abrogated by the New Covenant.  Hays primarily means this to apply to racial distinctions….

(To interject here, Hays recognized earlier in the book that the distinctions among Jew, Greek, Male, Female, Slave and Free were not in reality absolved.  Women remain women and slaves remain slaves, for example.  But he ambiguously and arbitrarily notes, or rather, notes that the scholar Dunn, notes that, “what are obliterated are the barriers formed by these differences and the relative value and status among the people of God based on these differences.” pg. 186.   This is, unfortunately, an irrelevant distinction.  Just because women are still women, despite Paul’s wording in Galatians, does not mean that women can marry women!  It’s beyond the scope of my paper to further expound on this argument at this time.)

….Therefore, Hays is rejecting the distinctions among men caused by nature, or at the very least, caused by time-honored human convention.  He rejects these in favor of a fiat-state of racial harmony, where men are united, not by blood bonds, but rather, by their mutual agreement to an abstract ideal.  In this case, the Abrahamic Covenant.

The covenant with Abraham is no longer a blood covenant, but a fiat-proposition; adherence to which, destroys all human sociological connection.  Whether this is a warranted conclusion from the text or not, cannot be decided in this particular blog.

However, what is clear, is that Hays is doing exactly what Cone, Sartre, Camus, Schelling, and all the other would-be gods of history have attempted, and that is:  discarding God’s order in favor of a propositional state of affairs that transcends man’s Earthly habitat. This is what Adam and Eve did in the Garden (as Van Til highlighted) and it is what Hays and other alienist proponents are doing with their theology.

This caricature may help illustrate my point and is, I hope, accurate:

1:  Membership in the Covenant obliterates sociological distinctions (primarily, he means: racial distinctions.)
2:  The Covenant is an abstract ideal (it cannot be found on the street corner.)
3:  Covenant membership is recognized by those who believe certain abstract ideals (Hays is a Baptist.)
4:  Those who are called, can become members of the Covenant.
5.  Blacks are called to become members of the Covenant.
6.  Whites are called to become members of the Covenant.
7.  Given 1, there are no longer blacks or whites in the Covenant, only Covenant members.
8.  Covenant members should associate in light of their status in the covenant, not in light of their sociological distinctions.

C:  Given 2, Covenant members associate in light of their mutual acceptance of a particular set of abstract ideals.

Instead of submitting to God-ordained order in creation, Hays is suggesting that Christianity teaches a submission of men to an abstract, fiat-order centering on those who accept a particular set of abstract ideals.

But, like William Mason observed in his poem “The English Garden,” when nature is thus thwarted, she will rise like a giant fiend from a Gothic tale, and destroy by night the work done by day.


A Teleological Argument: Part Deux

October 8, 2010

The more I think about the “Particular Teleological Argument Against Race Mixing” that I tried to build a few weeks ago…the less I like it.

The way I structured it just doesn’t scratch where I had an itch.

Think about it this way:

Suppose on a whim you go running one morning.  About a mile into it, you begin getting hot and tired and start wondering “why bother?”  “Well,” you respond, “I want to increase my physical health!”  But then, why go through the trouble (face the pain and do the work) required?  Why not just stop?

Well, that raises the question:  why should you do ANYTHING at all?  What is the rational reason to?  In the running situation, all of your natural affections are crying out for you to stop!  Living solely by the whims of our physical urges, while arbitrary, at least provides a “goal.”

Why get out of bed in the mornings?  Answer:  I have physical urges that I live to satisfy!

But is this acceptable for a Christian?  What about those of us who have some physical handicap that may cause us not to desire to live?  For such people…(I’ve been there more times than I care to relate)…finding a rational reason to carry on (in the absence of physical urgings) is a life-saving necessity!

Why run?  Why eat, drink, play or get out of bed in the morning at all?

We must believe that there is a rational purpose…a rational “telos”.  A rational reason for us to defy the fallen urges of our body and take on the world!  Getting out of bed is a revolutionary act in this case!

But WHY?  WHY get out of bed?  The preacher or Sunday School teacher will reply ambiguously:  “Jesus!”  or “He is risen!”  So what?!?  What does that rationally imply for me?  Why do those religious truths provide for me a reason to overcome draining physical impulses and arise from slothfulness?

As a Christian, I’m convinced that something about my religion provides a rational reason to get out of bed in the mornings.  Christianity MUST teach SOME sort of lesson about human destiny (and not just any human destiny, but MY destiny!  The destiny of Scott Terry!)

Those who speak about race-mixing imply that a person’s physical characteristics have nothing at all to do with a person’s individual destiny.  This is like saying that a person has nothing to do with his own destiny and that destiny itself is defined by state-fiat!  Because only the state can sanction abstract ideals (via majority vote if you’re lucky.)

I want to demonstrate this systematically and show that arbitrary fiat as “destiny” is just as arbitrary as living for one’s physical urges.

This all boils down to the original sin in the Garden of Eden.  Adam and Eve wanted their fiat word to be law!  They wanted to “know” between right and wrong!  (As in, judge for themselves…or, have right and wrong depend on their arbitrary whims…their “nature!”)  But, that right belongs to God alone.

Race mixers are surreptitiously accepting the relativism of the existentialist and thus, along with the atheist and other relativists out there, have no rational reason to rise out of bed in the mornings.

I want to keep re-working the argument until I’ve demonstrated this fact analytically.


A Teleological Argument Against Race-Mixing

September 8, 2010

(UPDATE:  See also, “A Teleological Argument Part Deux” )

In an earlier blog, I discussed what I was calling a “teleological argument against race-mixing.”  What I am presenting here is different than what I had in mind in that blog.  That argument concerns human telos in the abstract.  What I’m presenting here, concerns the particular “telos” or destiny of particular humans.

It is in no way finished.  In fact, I realize how wide-open I’ve left myself, specifically:  I’ve left premise 4 woefully incomplete, and premise 6 is a blatant assertion.

I post it now for two reasons.  I hope that people who favor my position can get a better idea about the direction I’m trying to go, and perhaps someone could help me shore up the premises and provide helpful suggestions for a stronger formulation.

This argument is aimed at the Reformed Christian.  It is from the Westminster Shorter Catechism that I have derived my theological wording.

This is the rare blog where I welcome, indeed, beg, for criticism and evaluation.  I intend to complete this argument if at all possible, and continue polishing it until it becomes fairly useful.  Race-mixing, however incomplete my current argument may be, is without a doubt an evil and I strongly believe those who attempt to allow for it systemically have no intellectual reason to get out of bed in the mornings!

1) The chief end of man is to glorify God and enjoy Him forever.

2) It is impossible to present a connotative definition for “Glorifying God” in the abstract. (For His own glory, He hath ordained whatsoever comes to pass.  ALL events in human experience are for God’s glory, even the evil ones.  Dying just as much as living.  Losing, just as much as winning.)

3) To present a view of particular human destiny, we must not abstract God’s glory from particular contexts. (In other words, Herman Bavinck, for instance, can talk about “human destiny” in the abstract, but not a particular destiny of a particular human.  He can only talk about a particular human if he does not abstract the human from his or her particular context.)

4) God has given us the Scriptures to direct us in how we are to glorify Him in particular contexts.

4.1) In order to coherently direct us toward God’s glory, the Scriptures must presuppose various distinctions in human experience, the most important being between various particular objects like humans, rocks, birds, etc.

4.2) Each distinction of this sort, presents an object with a unique destiny…a unique part in God’s plan.

4.3) This implies, in general terms, a corporate destiny for classes of particular objects, like humans, or rocks, or alligators.  This is implied, because the unique purpose of a particular object must be defined in terms of its immediate context.  (It is this corporate destiny of humanity that Bavinck can talk about in the abstract.)  For instance, the destiny of a particular rock must include its surroundings.  However, the cooperate destiny is implied by a general trend among the particulars, and not the other way around.  We may not generally find rocks floating in the ocean, but that’s not to say that God does not have “the ocean” in mind for a particular rock.

5) It’s possible to either accept unique destinies for particular humans (and their cooperate classes) or to reject unique destinies in favor of an abstract destiny, or no destiny at all.

5.1) If unique destinies are rejected in favor of “no destiny at all” the person is rejecting Christianity, or at least, Christian orthodoxy.

5.2) If unique destines are rejected in favor of abstract destiny, then, given 2, he cannot have a coherent view of particular human destiny.

6) Those who support race-mixing are necessarily promoting an abstract telos (abstract destiny) or no telos (no destiny at all).

Conclusion:  Those who promote race-mixing must either give up Christianity, or accept an incoherent view of human destiny.


So, you wanna be a theonomist…

September 2, 2010

Barring a run-in with a seminary-educated guy who knows the ins and outs of Meredith Kline’s covenant theology, the following tips will get the new theonomist through most encounters.

If you wanna be a theonomist, make SURE you know the answers to the following questions:

1) “You’re for executing witches and homosexuals?!?  How dare you?”

This will be the most common objection the theonomist will face.  It’s important to correctly recognize and deal with it swiftly.

This person is trying to emotionally brow-beat you into giving up your position.  In today’s society, the thought of executing a faggot, for instance, is unthinkable.   So, make sure you have lots of fun by affirming that, “yes, God has decreed that homosexuality and witchcraft are capital crimes!”

Always remember:  WHATEVER God says is what the theonomist advocates. (That doesn’t mean we defend the naive, unfair, or uneducated exegesis of the anti-theonomist.  Just because the anti-theonomist claims that God’s law demands we execute children, sell our daughters into slavery and allow the rape of women, doesn’t mean it’s true.)

2) A variation of question 1, would be:  “You hate homosexuals, witches, and probably women too!”

As a theonomist, one of the (many) things you’ll have to calmly and clearly repeat over and over, is that you have a righteous anger towards violations of God’s law, just like God does.  This doesn’t mean you “hate” anyone as a person, and it’s nothing personal.  “What if your son turns out to be a homosexual? Huh?  Would you argue for theonomy then?” This is the same sort of question.  Keep in mind that you’re arguing for God’s law in the abstract, and the fact that your hypothetical child is a homosexual does not invalidate the authority of God’s law over all men.  Just counter the objection by clearly stating how absurd it is:  “Shotgun’s son is a homosexual…therefore…God’s law is not applicable to all men. See?  That doesn’t follow!

3) Well, you may be OK with executing homos and witches, but would you execute your hypothetical 2 year old for misbehaving?  Do you play football (IE:  do you handle pig skin?)  Do you work on Sunday?  Do you wear cloth of different materials? Do you eat shell-fish?

There are a couple of things happening here.

As in question 1, they are still trying to emotionally brow-beat you into giving up your position.

But, they are also making the argument:  “Shotgun has violated God’s law in the past”, or, “Shotgun would never advocate certain aspects of God’s law like executing 2 year olds”…so, therefore, “Shotgun is not a consistent theonomist.”

Remember from 1:  “WHATEVER God’s law teaches, that’s what I’m advocating!”

So, even if Shotgun has violated God’s law in the past, that doesn’t magically mean that God’s law is not applicable to all men today.

Secondly, the person making this argument is ignorant of Christian covenant theology (most people are) and doesn’t realize that the NT has abrogated the dietary laws.

MEMORIZE THE FOLLOWING VERSE: 1 Corinthians 8:8, the Apostle Paul abrogates the food laws by telling us that food does not bring us closer to God and that we can eat whatever we want as long as it doesn’t cause our brother to fall into sin.   It is tempting to appeal to Acts 10, starting in verse 9, when Peter has a vision with all different sorts of animals, and is told to “kill and eat.”  However, this passage is probably talking about the Jew / Gentile relationship and is not referring to food per-se.  So when showing that the dietary laws are no longer applicable, it’s best to go with 1 Corinthians.

Always remember the talking point:  “We follow God’s law in light of the NT revelation!”

The ceremonial aspects of the law have been fulfilled by Christ.  So, the wearing of mixed fabrics, the eating of shell-fish, and other such laws, are no longer binding on us civilly.

4) You would execute children, or force a woman who has been raped to marry her rapist?  You sick SOB!

They will not let things like this go, so, even if you keep telling them over and over, that “Whatever God’s law teaches, that’s what I’m advocating…” you should still be prepared to explain things like this.  If you are the only theonomist in the room, then you need to be the guy in the room that knows the most about God’s law.

The following 3 examples are the ones that come up most often and so I’ll provide a brief explanation for each, and you can build off of them in your studies and figure out the best way to use them in a discussion.  It’s always best to make it clear that WHATEVER God’s law teaches, that’s what you’re advocating, and leave the hemming and hawing to them.  However, we cannot be a slave to their naive understanding of God’s law either.  So you should probably memorize these verses as well:

Executing Homosexuals:

First of all, no one can be executed unless there are at least two witnesses testifying against them. Deut 17 6, 7.

“On the testimony of two or three witnesses a man shall be put to death, but no one shall be put to death on the testimony of only one witness.  The hands of the witnesses must be the first in putting him to death, and then the hands of all the people.  You must purge the evil from among you.”

So, unless two people are willing to drag the homosexual into court and testify against him, he’s not going to become the victim of some Orwellian enforcement scheme.  The laws against homosexuality in the OT,  Leviticus 18,22 and again in Leviticus 20,13, are meant to keep the homosexual in the closet where he belongs, or to run him out from among the people.  No Gay-Pride marches in a Godly society!

Executing Unruly Children:

Because the anti-theonomist is trying to emotionally brow-beat you, he isn’t going to fairly interpret God’s law.  So, you have to be ready with a good understanding of what it means to execute an unruly child.  It does NOT mean executing 2 year olds.

Let’s look at the verse, Deut 21: 18-21 (another good one to memorize!):

“If a man has a stubborn and rebellious son who does not obey his father and mother and will not listen to them when they discipline him, his father and mother shall take hold of him and bring him to the elders at the gate of his town. They shall say to the elders, “This son of ours is stubborn and rebellious. He will not obey us. He is a profligate and a drunkard.”  Then all the men of his town shall stone him to death. You must purge the evil from among you. All Israel will hear of it and be afraid.”

We can see here that the law is obviously not meant to include unruly children, but is rather meant for older children who repeatedly disobey their parents, who are drunkards and who self-consciously throw off the authority of their parents.  Without going into further explanations about the law (see Gary North’s book “Victim’s Rightsfor a thorough discussion of this) we can see, that it is disingenuous for someone to accuse the theonomist of wanting to slaughter children.

A rape victim forced to marry her rapist:

Deuteronomy 23:28, 29:

“If a man happens to meet a virgin who is not pledged to be married and rapes her and they are discovered, he shall pay the girl’s father fifty shekels of silver.  He must marry the girl, for he has violated her.  He can never divorce her as long as he lives.”

Without going into too much detail, this passage is demonstrating a punishment to the rapist and provides support for the woman.  The anti-theonomist was raised on Nintendo, Pepsi, and Britney Spears, and has no idea what a true patriarchal culture is all about.

Every marriage must involve a dowry.  The man must provide a sum of money to the woman that acts as an investment in the future.  If a virgin woman is raped, she is robbed of this dowry and thus, robbed of her security for the future, because she has been defiled outside of marriage.

The rapist is legally required to marry her (and thus provide her a dowry) and cannot legally divorce her.  However, the woman can legally divorce him (making her legitimate again) she would just have to give up his dowry.  So, basically, this law does two things for the woman.  It provides her with a dowry until she finds another husband and also provides her with a means to become a legitimate woman in society again.  (It’s not illegal to marry a divorced woman!)

5) Jesus did away with the Law by letting the woman caught in Adultery go!  Jesus established a rule:  “He who is without sin, cast the first stone” and that means, since no one is without sin, then no one can enforce the Law!

This is pure B/S, and you will hear it over and over.  So, be ready to answer it.

1.  The passage being referred to is John chapter 8, verses 1 through 11.  Turn there in your NIV and you’ll see this warning message:  “The earliest and most reliable manuscripts and other ancient witnesses do not have John 7:53 – 8:11.” Whaaaa?

That’s right.  Most scholars and even Christian apologists agree, this entire passage is not an original part of the Biblical canon, but was a later addition.

2.  EVEN IF we take this passage as authoritative…we can see that Christ is clearly upholding the law.  Remember (from above) that the only way a person can be legally executed is at the behest of two witnesses, and the two witnesses must be the first the cast the stones.

In this passage, we see Christ bending down and writing something on the ground.  Whatever He wrote, and whatever He said to the men, caused them to wander off, leaving the accused woman and Jesus standing there alone.

Now…since no one was there to witness against the women, then, she couldn’t be legally executed!  Christ knew the law and worked out a loop-hole for the woman!

He certainly wasn’t abrogating the entire law in that passage!

6) How can you consistently apply OT law to today’s society?  Isn’t that just tyranny of opinion?

A talking point you need to memorize in response to these sorts of questions is this:

“I am just an apologist arguing that God’s law should apply to society today…I am not a judge or lawyer or civil magistrate, and thus I cannot enforce the law, nor can I say what the application to today’s society will look like!”

They will try throwing all sorts of hypothetical problems at you…just keep repeating the above.  It’s possible to argue that God’s law is applicable to today’s society without having all the answers for how that would look.

Also, please note:

Differences of opinion, problems of interpretation, and miscarriages of justice, are not a unique problem for theonomists.   They are human problems and all systems of government will have to deal with them.  Don’t allow yourself to get trapped — as if “theonomy” is somehow subject to these failings in a special way.

7) Would you kill a random homosexual on the street if you saw him?

If he tried to hit on me, I might…but as a theonomist, we believe that only the civil magistrates are allowed to carry out executions, (or either a crowd of citizens guided by civil magistrates after a fair trial.)  See the answer to question 6.

8 ) We are NOT under the law today, we are under grace, you Pharisee!

You will hear this from your Christian opponents almost non-stop, so always remember to clearly establish a distinction between obeying a civil law (law of the land; a law that governs your state and society) and obeying a law to obtain salvation.

We as theonomists are NOT saying that following God’s law will bring us salvation.  (Technically, the only way to gain salvation is by obeying the law perfectly, but no man can do that.  So, we rely on the perfect obedience of Christ to do it for us!  So, technically, we ARE saved by obedience to the law…just not our obedience, but rather, Christs’!)

Make sure they understand that we’re not teaching any sort of salvation by works ideology.

To Conclude:

I’ve tried to cover the main objections that you, as a wanna-be theonomist will likely encounter.  There will be others.  There is are a variety of combinations to what I’ve provided.  Just remember the talking points.  And always keep reading and studying.  As you grow intellectually, your opponents will also grow, and you’ll begin encountering more sophisticated arguments.

But, no matter how sophisticated you get, when talking with the average Joe, you’re always going to encounter some form of the arguments I’ve provided.

Memorize the scriptures, and stay true to God’s Law.

After all:

Blessed is the man who does not walk in the counsel of the wicked or stand in the way of sinners or sit in the seat of mockers.  But his delight is in the law of the Lord and on His law he meditates day and night.  He is like a tree planted by streams of water which yields its fruit in season and whose leaf does not wither.  Whatever he does prospers. – Psalm 1


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